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Abstract 
In this paper we estimate the impact of health insurance coverage beyond National Health 
Insurance on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal 
with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. It 
is hard to think, however, of any variable that a priori would be a good instrument and, therefore, 
we take a different approach. We concentrate on the most common health insurance plan in the 
Portuguese Health Survey, (ADSE), which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. We 
argue that this insurance is exogenous for most people i.e. not correlated with their health status. 
Under this identifying assumption we estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on three 
different health services using a matching estimator technique. The measures of demand for health 
services are number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a 
dentist. Preliminary results show large effects of ADSE for number of visits and tests among the 
young (18 to 30 years old) but only for tests are these effects statistically significantly different 
from zero. The magnitude of the effects represent 21.8 and 30 percent of the average number of 
visits and tests for the young. On the contrary we find no evidence of moral hazard on the 
probability of visiting a dentist. Finally, we argue that there is evidence of a positive cumulative 
effect of ADSE over the years. 
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1 Introduction
The widespread usage – by health insurance companies, and governments – of copay-
ments, coinsurance, and deductibles as mechanisms to control health-care spending re-
flects the belief that the demand for health-care reacts to price. The literature on the field,
however, has not yet produced irrefutable evidence on the magnitude of this reaction.
By decreasing the price-per-service faced by patients, health insurance increases health-
care demand whenever demand is elastic. The potential effect of health insurance on
demand for health services – usually denoted by moral hazard – was first identified by
Arrow (1963).1 The first study to show in an experimental setting the impact of insurance
on the demand for health services was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE)
(e.g. Manning et al., 1987, and Newhouse, 1993). The RHIE suffered criticisms on its de-
sign reflecting the difficulty of implementing an experiment when health may be at stake.
The greatest advantage of the RHIE relative to subsequent studies is the randomization
of the insurance type across individuals. Randomization establishes the exogeneity of the
insurance status and allows the identification of the increase in health services utilization
with moral hazard. Since the RHIE, many researchers turned to field data to estimate the
effect of health insurance on health-care demand. In non-experimental settings, however,
the decision to buy (extra) insurance is not random but depends on the characteristics
of the individual. In particular, the higher the individual’s risk the higher is the opti-
mal insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). For example, within a National
Health Insurance System individuals who contract private insurance are likely to be those
who anticipate, based on private information, a higher than average demand for health
care (e.g. Cameron et al., 1988 and Vera, 1999). Ignoring that adverse selection causes
the private health insurance variable to be endogenous leads to an overestimation of its
impact on the demand for health services.
The traditional way to deal with the endogeneity of the private (or extra) insurance
is to find instrumental variables, which should be correlated with the decision to contract
1Meza (1983) criticizes attributing this effect solely to moral hazard. Vera (1999) follows the same
line of argument. Moral hazard is the difference in demand of an insured individual with and without
perfect information. Of course, the latter situation is not observed. A positive impact on demand from
additional insurance is compatible with moral hazard but is not proof of moral hazard.
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additional insurance but not correlated with the use of health services.2 Santos Silva and
Bago d’Uva (2002) argue that the only such variables are those related to an individual’s
risk aversion. Unfortunately, it is hard to find such variables in most health surveys.
Some authors, e.g. Vera (1999) and Holly (2002), have used socioeconomic variables as
instruments for the insurance decision with limited success. While Holly’s work is still
unfinished, Vera’s coefficient estimates suffer from high standard deviations which hamper
any meaningful conclusions about the true impact of the private insurance on the demand
for physician services.
The presence of screening by the insurance companies and supply-induced demand by
the health-care providers (Holly et al., 1998) are also potential sources of bias. Screen-
ing would bias downwards the effect from insurance on utilization while supply-induced
demand would bias it upwards. Our data does not suffer from screening biases but may
be subject to supply-induced demand. We think the latter is of no consequence in our
context because the insurer’s payments to providers are relatively low. Nonetheless, find-
ing that extra coverage from private (or extra) insurance within a public national health
system increases the demand for health-care is consistent with both moral hazard and
supply-induced demand.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of additional insurance coverage on
the demand for health-care within a National Health System using the data from the
Portuguese Health Survey (1998/1999).3 The main contributions of this paper to the
literature lie in the different approach we take to measure the impact of insurance. First,
we use a dataset in which approximately ten percent of individuals are covered by an
insurance plan that is unrelated to their current health status. The exogeneity of this
coverage removes the need to use instrumental-variable estimation. More specifically, we
focus on the most common health insurance plan in the country (ADSE), which is given
to all civil servants and their dependants.4 ADSE beneficiaries have double coverage since
2An exception, within studies using field data, is Chiappori et al. (1998) who use longitudinal data
from a natural experiment in France.
3“Inquérito Nacional de Saúde 98/99”. Data has been collected from October 1998 to September
1999.
4Civil servants in Portugal are employed for life. This is the main advantage of becoming a civil
servant. Moreover, at least at the lower end of qualification the Government pays higher salaries than
the private sector.
3
they always have access to the National Health Service just like any other citizen.
Second, we use a matching estimator technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2004), which
does not impose any functional form on the impact of health insurance on the demand
for health services and allows for heterogenous impacts. The treated group is composed
by individuals with ADSE coverage and the control group is composed by individuals
covered by the National Health Service (NHS) alone.5
Third, we estimate the impact of additional insurance on several health services. Tra-
ditionally, the literature has focused on “number of visits to the doctor”. We believe
there is measurement error in this variable: a visit is not an homogenous service, and
may vary in quality and duration. More importantly, the measurement error may be cor-
related with insurance status. For example, those with additional (or private) insurance
may have access to better quality and longer visits. In our case, it is also possible that
“number of visits to the doctor” is subject to inducement since ADSE pays doctors per
visit. Alternatively, we also estimate the impact of additional health insurance on the
“number of blood and urine tests” as well as on “at least one visit to the dentist in 12
months.” Relative to number of visits to the doctor, the former is a more objective and
homogenous measure, in particular its quality is independent of the insurance status. It is
possible, however, that ADSE doctors use the number of diagnostic tests to justify more
visits so that similarly to number of visits, number of tests would be subject to demand-
inducement. On the contrary, it is less likely that “at least one visit to the dentist in 12
months” be affected by inducement since ADSE pays dentists by type of procedure and
not by visit.
Fourth, since some individuals in our treated group may have been subject to treatment
for a long period of time, we split the sample into different age groups in order to control
for bias that may arise in case health benefits from better treatment accumulate over time.
If this were true, health differences between the treated and the untreated group should
increase with age. While, the young individuals with access to the additional insurance
may not have had the time to accumulate health benefits, it is plausible that among
the older generation, the treated are healthier than their NHS-only counterparts. By
5A drawback of the matching technique is the lack of estimates for the effects of exogenous variables
beyond the treatment.
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reporting the results for different age groups we are also trying to separate the “immediate
effect” of treatment from its cumulative effect. The presence of a dynamic effect and the
effort to distinguish between short and long-term effects of treatments is, as far as we
know, innovative. We think this estimation strategy may even be of some relevance in
experimental settings where individuals are subject to treatment for different durations.
The more conservative average treatment effects (ATT) estimates for the overall sam-
ple are: 0.096 for number of visits, which corresponds to 6 percent of the average number
of visits, and is not statistically significantly different from zero; and a value of 0.057 for
number of tests, which corresponds to 15.8 percent of the average number of tests, which
is statistically significantly different from zero. Results show that the ATT for number of
tests is more precisely estimated than the ATT for number of visits. The ATT for number
of visits and number of tests for the youngest group is always the largest, which may be
evidence that ADSE beneficiaries accumulate health benefits over time. The estimated
ATT represents 21.8 and 30 percent of the youngest group average number of visits and
tests, respectively, but only the latter is almost statistically significantly different from
zero. The effects for other age groups are not statistically significantly different from zero.
Surprisingly, for at least one visits to the dentist the ATT is smaller and not statistically
significantly different from zero. We interpret the latter result in light of Chiappori et al.
(1998) who argued that for services where the non-monetary costs were high the demand
would be more inelastic.
Finally, we provide some evidence of the exogeneity of the treatment by taking a sample
of individuals, the unemployed, who have extra insurance through a family member and
compare them with the unemployed from the control group. The effect of treatment
on the unemployed’s demand for health services should only reflect moral hazard (and/or
supply induced demand) and not adverse selection because it is unlikely that they decided
the job status of their family members.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the recent literature on
the subject and briefly describes the Portuguese health system; Section 3 describes the
dataset; Section 4 makes a exploratory analyses of the data; Section 5 describes the
matching estimator methodology; Section 6 describes the main results; Section 7 discusses
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the plausibility of exogeneity of the ADSE status; Finally, Section 8 concludes. The
Appendix contains tables with results.
2 Background
2.1 Short Review of the Literature
The onset of the literature started with Arrow’s prediction (Arrow, 1963) that by de-
creasing the effective price of health services faced by patients, health insurance triggers
an increase in the demand for health services. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment,
RHIE, (e.g. Manning et al., 1987, and Newhouse, 1993) was the first study to offer em-
pirical evidence of Arrow’s theory using data from a controlled experiment. As pointed
out in the Introduction, however, in non-experimental settings the decision to buy (extra)
insurance is not random but suffers from adverse selection, i.e. the higher the individual’s
risk the higher is the optimal insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
The two other potential sources of endogeneity of insurance status have been almost
ignored by the received literature, perhaps because their perceived effects are small. The
first one is screening from private insurance companies. Screening consists in denying
insurance coverage to the highest risks. The second source is supply-induced demand.
A doctor/hospital may induce more demand from those patients holding more generous
insurance since these patients pay a smaller fraction of the fees. The inducement of
demand is likely to be stronger when insurance companies pay fee-for-service to doctors
or hospitals.
If insurance choice is affected by adverse selection, ignoring it will lead to an overesti-
mation of the moral hazard effect in the demand for health care services. The traditional
way of controlling for this potential bias is to use Instrumental Variables (e.g. Cameron
et al.,1988, Coulson et al., 1995, Holly et al., 1998, Vera, 1999, Savage and Wright, 2003).
The econometric model for health services usage varies substantially in the literature,
depending on both the characteristic of the dependent variable, e.g. count or binary,
and the convenience of the model. For example, Cameron et al. (1988) start with a
negbin specification but switch to a linear specification when they instrument for the
insurance variable. The typical instruments used are socioeconomic variables that tend
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to be more associated with the insurance decision than with health care utilization. It is
hard, however, to justify that any of these variables is an appropriate instrument. While
Vera (1999) justifies the use of these variables as instrumental variables by deriving a
structural model of demand for health care and insurance, Santos Silva and Bago d’Uva
(2001) argue that the appropriate instruments should be (unobserved) variables related
to risk aversion which are absent from most datasets. We agree that appropriate instru-
mental variables are hard to find. Chiappori et al. (1998) avoid the use of instrumental
variables by relying on a natural experiment in France. Yet, natural experiments are a
rare phenomenon. Our paper also avoids the use of instrumental variables and instead
argues that the civil servant insurance scheme in Portugal (ADSE) is exogenous to the
beneficiaries’ health.6
If insurance choice is only affected by screening from insurance companies then ignoring
this effect may lead to an underestimation of the moral hazard effect (Coulson et al, 1995).
The literature has not paid attention to this potential bias.
Finally, when supply-induced demand is correlated with insurance status the estimated
effect of moral hazard will be, most likely, biased upwards.7 Van de Voorde’s et al. (2001)
estimates of price elasticities in a context with high incentives to induce demand are, in
general, similar to those obtained in the RHIE. The authors conclude that, at least in the
short-run, the level of demand inducement is low.
Most of the empirical literature has shown evidence of both moral hazard and adverse
selection in the health care market. The literature has also shown that the level of moral
hazard differs across health services. Cameron et al. (1988) using data for Australia
find that for a broad range of services more generous coverage leads to higher utilization
both because of moral hazard and adverse selection. Savage and Wright (2003), also
for Australia, find that private insurance increases hospital length of stay. Vera (1999)
using data for a Spanish region finds different evidence for heads-of-household and non-
6We were recently aware of simultaneous work by Trujillo et al. (2005) where the authors rely on a
propensity score matching approach, similar to our matching estimator, to evaluate the impact of a social
subsidy on the demand for health care from the poor in Colombia.
7Presumably doctors/hospitals induce more demand on those that have more generous coverage. It is
possible, however, that the level of inducement is directly related to the amount the insurer pays to the
doctor/hospital for the visit, in which case the bias may be reversed.
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heads-of-household. For heads of household, presumably those that take the insurance
decision, there is evidence of adverse selection but no evidence of moral hazard. On the
contrary, for non-heads of household, there is evidence of moral hazard. More recently
Olivella and Vera (2005) show evidence of adverse selection using data from the British
household panel survey. Coulson et al. (1995) find that supplemental insurance increases
the number of prescriptions filled among the elderly in the United States, i.e. moral
hazard, but do not find evidence of adverse selection. Holly et al. (1998) using data for
Switzerland find both evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in hospital stays.
Deb and Trivedi (2002) use data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment where the
insurance choice is exogenous. They find that given everything else constant, an increase
in the coinsurance rate decreases the utilization although this effect is only significant
at the 10% level. Finally, Chiappori et al. (1998) find evidence of moral hazard for GP
home visits but not for office visits to a GP or to a specialist. The authors argue that
the presence of high non-monetary costs associated with office visits translates a small
change in price into a negligible change in the total cost bared by the patient. On the
contrary, for GP home visits, the non-monetary costs are virtually inexistent, making a
small change in price more noticeable.
Most studies control for individual’s subjective assessment of health status because
these are strong predictors of health services utilization (e.g. Cameron et al., 1988, Coul-
son et al., 1995, Vera, 1999). These variables are, however, likely to be endogenous, i.e.
correlated with the unobserved variables in the health demand equation (Windjmeyer
and Santos Silva, 1997). Windjmeyer and Santos Silva (1997) suggest to use long-term
determinants of health, such as smoking and drinking, as instruments for the subjective
health measures. In this paper, we present results with and without matching on subjec-
tive health measures but give more credibility to the results without subjective measures.
In Appendix A we provide a theoretical motivation for not including subjective health
variables in the regressions.
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2.2 The Portuguese Health Care System
This Section will borrow heavily on Bentes et al. (2004) report, which describes at length
the Portuguese health system from its beginning until 2002. The Portuguese National
Health Service (NHS) was born in 1979 when legislation was passed establishing the right
of all citizens to health protection, a guaranteed right to universal free health-care through
the NHS, and access to the NHS for all citizens regardless of economic and social status.
Before 1979, the state only covered the costs of health-care for civil servants, and
provided limited preventive care, maternal and child health-care, mental health, as well
as some control of infectious diseases. The evolution of the health system in Portugal
implies relatively better access to health-care by the elder cohorts of ADSE beneficiaries
in our sample in comparison with their NHS-only counterparts. Our results by age group
show that the impact of ADSE is higher for the youngest generation while smaller and not
statistically significantly different from zero for the older groups. This result is compatible
with the elderly ADSE beneficiaries being (unobservably) healthier than their NHS-only
matches.
After 1979, some aspects of the pre-NHS period remained such as the health subsys-
tems (from the Portuguese subsistemas). These are health insurance schemes for which
membership is based on professional or occupational category. Bentes et al. (2004) state
that these schemes were kept because trade unions were not willing to give up the good
service and easy access to a wide range of providers. As a consequence, by 2004 about
25% of the population had, in addition to the NHS, coverage from some of the health sub-
systems (for a brief description of these health subsystems see Bentes et al., 2004 pages
21-24). The subsystems either use their infrastructure to provide treatment or contract
with private or public providers. The largest subsystem and the focus of our paper, ADSE,
covers 15% of the population including all employees of the NHS. This is a compulsory
scheme for civil servants for which they pay 1% of their salary. ADSE beneficiaries have
access to three types of assistance: First, ADSE has agreements with providers where the
beneficiaries enjoy reduced copayments; Second, the beneficiaries may decide to choose
a provider outside the ADSE agreement network in which case they pay a higher copay-
ment. Finally, ADSE beneficiaries may also benefit from all services offered by the NHS
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network subject to the same small copayments and exemptions as any user of the NHS.
According to Bentes et al. (2004), generally the subsystems offer larger benefits than the
NHS. The NHS is predominantly funded through general taxation. The health subsys-
tems are funded through employer and employee contributions although for example the
ADSE needs to be topped up with money from the Government budget.
After 1992, hospitals and health centers started applying small copayments to NHS
users. There is, however, a substantial fraction of the NHS users who are exempt.8 Copay-
ments and spending in private doctor visits are deductible from income tax, which means
a de facto subsidy by the state. Copayments in the NHS are homogenous across special-
ties and only vary with the nature of the visit – emergency visits are more expensive–
and with the type of health care center –visits at central and larger hospitals are more
expensive. Copayments in the NHS range between 2 Euros for GP visits at the local
health care center and 5 Euros for emergency visits to general hospitals. Diagnostic tests
are also subject to copayments.9
Although the NHS is expected to offer all services demanded, in practice there is very
limited provision of certain services such as dental care for adults. Adults demanding
dental care usually consult a private dentist. Bentes et al., 2004 refer that according to
1995/1996 Health Survey 92% of all dentist visits are private. For the ADSE beneficiaries,
the coverage for private dentists with no ADSE agreement is 80% up to a limit amount
and the copayment for dentists with ADSE agreements depend on the specific treatment
but vary between 0.95 Euros to 9.18 Euros with no limit. Legally, NHS-only beneficiaries
may get partial reimbursements for their dentist visits and treatments but these are so
low that few people take the trouble of filling the paperwork. In short, for dental care
ADSE beneficiaries face a much better coverage than their NHS-only counterparts who
are, in practice, left without coverage.
The private sector has been growing steadily and in 1998/99 accounted for about 32%
of the specialists visits while the wide majority of the GP visits were carried out in the
8NHS users exempt from copayments are: the low income, the unemployed, the chronically-ill, preg-
nant women, children up to 12 years old, drug abusers under treatment, and the mentally-ill.
9source: http://www.arsc.online.pt/scripts/cv.dll?sec=sns&pass=guia_utente#15. Law published in
1992 (Portaria no338/92, 11 April). The more recent regulation is Portaria 103/2004, 23 January.
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public sector (Bentes et al., 2004). While the percentage of private hospitals beds is only
about 23% of total stock, the presence of the private sector in dental services, blood tests,
X-rays, dialysis, and physiotherapy is considerably higher (Bentes et al., 2004).
3 The dataset
The dataset covers 48606 individuals belonging to 18186 families and 17491 households.
The sample is selected following the multi-stage design of the census: geographical areas
are drawn randomly and in several stages with probability proportional to their popula-
tion. Within each of the smallest geographical area level, containing around 300 house-
holds, random draws select which households will be interviewed.
The dataset has information on socio-demographic characteristics, income levels, doc-
tor and hospital visits, medical procedures, expenditures on physician services, objective
and subjective measures of health status (e.g. obesity, and “feels in very good health”),
and consumption habits that may affect health (e.g. tobacco and alcohol consumption).
Finally, there is also information about health insurance status of each individual. Most
individuals are only beneficiaries of the public National Health System (84%), followed
by civil servants and their dependants who are beneficiaries of ADSE (9.99%), third those
with private insurance (1.7%) and lastly there are up to 5 different insurance schemes
linked to the military and the police.10 We use three different variables to capture the
demand for health services: 1) the number of physician visits in the previous 3 months; 2)
the number of blood and urine tests in the previous 3 months; 3) whether the individual
has visited the dentist in the last year. Importantly, a serious drawback of this dataset
is not to know how many of the visits or tests were done in the private sector and how
many were done in the NHS.
Our working sample was obtained after dropping a few observations from the data.
First, we dropped 7 observations corresponding to situations where the insurance status
of the individual was not known. Second, we drop 191 observations of pregnant women
whose visits to the doctor were related to the pregnancy. Third, we deleted observations
10The data also contains information regarding the risks covered by the insurance plan for those in-
dividuals who declare having an insurance. Only 4.77% of the respondents declare having an insurance,
which reflects a lack of understanding of the health system.
11
with inconsistent answers: 14 individuals declare not to have visited the doctor in the
previous 3 months but yet declare to have visited a private doctor; 19 individuals who
also declare not to have gone to the doctor in 3 months but declare to have gone to
their nearest health center; a total of 7 people declare not to have visited the doctor
but have gone either to a public or private hospital. Fourth, the information about
a given individual in the dataset may be provided by the individual himself, as long
as older than 15 years of age, or by a different person in the household. We dropped
165 observations corresponding to information provided by non-family members due to
potential measurement error or missing values in important variables. We also dropped
2854 observations corresponding to people with special insurance status different from
ADSE and the National Health System. These observations correspond to the military
(1.09%), the police forces (1.45%), the judicial system employees and their dependants
(0.29%), banking employees and their dependants (1.38%), as well as people with private
insurance (1.7%). We decided to delete all these insurance types from the control group
for two reasons: first, because the insurance coverage and copayments may differ, which
may affect the beneficiaries behavior. Second, there may be non-observable variables
correlated with the insurance type that may also affect individual’s behavior.
Finally, we restrict the sample to observations where the individual answers for himself.
This excludes minors from the sample. We also delete observations with missing values
on the exogenous variables used. In the case we wish to include a variable with too many
missing values such as the daily wine consumption (in litres) we create a dummy vari-
able (winens) that equals one whenever the variable wine is missing, and zero otherwise.
Altogether, our working samples range from 21151 to 21908 observations.
4 Preliminary and Exploratory analysis of the data
In this Section we perform a very preliminary analysis of the data. Table 1 shows some
statistics relative to the first measure of health care services, number of visits to a doctor
in the previous 3 months. The second column of Table 1 shows that, regardless of their
insurance status, 53 percent of the people had at least one visit to the doctor in the
previous 3 months. The p-value of the t-test indicates that the unconditional probability
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of at least one visit does not significantly differ across insurance types. However, as the
first column of Table 1 also shows the average number of visits to the doctor is significantly
smaller for the beneficiaries of ADSE than for those with the NHS-only. The higher
number of visits for the beneficiaries of the NHS-only may reflect the requirement to visit
a GP before visiting a specialist, this is not a requirement for the ADSE beneficiaries.
This requirement is one of the main reasons why we consider visits to the doctor to be a
less than perfect variable to study the prevalence of moral hazard in this context.
In order to circumvent the potential measurement error in number of visits, we also
analyze blood and urine tests. Statistics for number of tests are shown in Table 2. The
unconditional mean for number of tests for the ADSE group is significantly higher than
the mean number of tests for the NHS-only group.
Another measure of interest is dental services. ADSE has a generous coverage for
dental services while the NHS-only beneficiaries, in practice, visit private dentists and
pay the full fee. As expected, the unconditional probability of having at least one visit to
the dentist in the previous 12 months is significantly higher for the ADSE group than for
the NHS-only group as table 3 shows.
The differences between the two types of insurance are wider if one looks at certain
pre-determined variables (see Table 4). The NHS-only group is relatively poorer and
older than the ADSE group. In the ADSE group there are less married or widows than
in the NHS-only group and more single and divorced people. The regional distribution
of the two groups is also unequal in the full sample. Most civil servants are concentrated
in the capital and less in the other areas of the country with the exception of Alentejo,
which is the least dense populated region in the country.11 The ADSE group is more
educated than the NHS-only group. The difference is even greater when the comparison
involves the no-student population of the two groups since the ADSE group contains a
larger proportion of students. The ADSE group also contains less people who are out of
the labor force, on sick leave for more than 3 months, not working for some other reason,
or unemployed. The percentage of people answering the questionnaire about him/her self
is statistically the same in both insurance groups.
11The five regions correspond to the five regional health administrations.
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In the ADSE group people feel healthier than in the NHS-only group as one can observe
by the statistics on subjective health on Table 5. This makes sense since the presence of
physical limitations and chronic diseases is more prevalent amongst the NHS-only group
with the exception of allergies, which are more common amongst the ADSE beneficiaries.
The ADSE group, perhaps because of the younger age, practices more exercise, drinks less
wine and beer and have less weight problems than the NHS-only group. The percentage of
smokers is, however, statistically the same in both groups. Finally, the ADSE beneficiaries
practice a better dental hygiene than the NHS-only group.
5 Methodology
Our treatment group is composed of ADSE beneficiaries and represents roughly 10 percent
of our sample. ADSE is the most common health insurance plan in the country, which
is given to all civil servants and their dependants. The matching estimator proposed
by Abadie and Imbens (2004) is used to estimate the “average treatment effect on the
treated” (ATT) i.e. the average increase in the demand for health services amongst ADSE
beneficiaries due to their double coverage. We argue it is very unlikely that individuals
want to become civil servants just in order to benefit from ADSE health insurance since
the NHS offers practically universal service. Moreover, if health coverage were the main
objective, other health subsystems, such as the one of the banking sector, offer much
better coverage than ADSE. If our argument is true then we may rule out the typical
adverse selection in additional insurance. It is also implausible for the state to choose
individuals on the basis of health variables unobserved to us. The hiring process for civil
servants is highly regulated and the starts with a public call for applicants who need to
fulfill certain criteria. Beyond being physically capable for the job, health status is not
included among the criteria.12 In short, we believe there are good arguments to discard
selection bias in our ATT estimates.
Our ATT estimates may be underestimated if ADSE beneficiaries enjoy more or better
treatment than NHS-only beneficiaries. Over the individuals’ life, this better treatment
would translate into a significant accumulation of health advantages by the ADSE benefi-
12The law is written in Decreto-Lei no. 204/98, de 11.07, article 29.
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ciaries relative to their NHS-only counterparts. In this case, the impact of ADSE should
be larger for the young beneficiaries who did not yet had the time to accumulate health
advantages, and smaller for the old beneficiaries sho would be healthier than their NHS-
only matches and, therefore, demand less health services. In order to identify this effect
we estimate the ATT for each age group separately.
Finally, the ATT may overestimate moral hazard if there is supply-induced demand
for ADSE beneficiaries. Supply inducement is more likely to occur in the number of visits
to the doctor and in the number of tests since ADSE pays per visit except to dentists who
are paid by procedure.13 However, the ADSE payments to doctors are low so we think
the magnitude of this effect, if positive, is relatively small.
Various methods of semiparametric estimation of average treatment effects under ex-
ogeneity have recently been proposed in the econometric literature (see Imbens, 2004, for
a review and references). In this paper, we apply matching estimators in order to esti-
mate the impact of having additional health insurance coverage on the demand for health
services. Matching estimators have not been applied before in this context and have the
advantage of avoiding the imposition of functional form restrictions.14 In particular, we
apply the matching estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2004), “AI” in what fol-
lows, who derive the large sample properties of matching estimators of average treatment
effects and consistent estimators for their variance.15
We are interested in estimating the average effect of a binary treatment (having ADSE
health insurance coverage) on some outcomes (several measures of health care utilization:
physician visits, tests and dentist visits within different time periods). Each individual i,
with i = 1, ..., N , is characterized by a pair of potential outcomes, Yi(0) for the outcome
13Doctors may request more tests in order to justify more visits. Inducement by dentists would be
reflected in a misreport of the type of services provided to the patient and not in the number of visits to
the dentist.
14Both matching and traditional regression analysis assume that selection into treatment is “on the
observables”. Contrary to regression analysis, matching does not make the linear functional form as-
sumption. Moreover, if selection is actually on the observables but linearity does not hold, then matching
estimates are consistent while regression estimates are not.
15While AI focus on “covariate matching”, many recent studies have relied on propensity score match-
ing. No variance estimator has been proposed for the case when the propensity score is estimated rather
than known and researchers often use bootstrapping methods. However, Abadie and Imbens (2005) show
that the standard bootstrap is generally invalid and AI provide, for the time being, the only analytic
variance estimators that are formally justified.
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under the control treatment i.e. the NHS-only, and Yi(1) for the outcome under the active
treatment i.e. ADSE. For each individual i we observe the triple (Wi, Xi, Yi), where Xi is
a vector of covariates, Wi, Wi ∈ {0, 1} indicates the treatment received and Yi, denotes
the realized outcome:
Yi ≡ Yi(Wi) =


Yi(0) if Wi = 0
Yi(1) if Wi = 1.
(1)
The realized outcome is equal to the Yi(0) if the individual is not an ADSE beneficiary
and equals Yi(1) otherwise. Note that the treated outcome, Y (1), is only observed for
treated units while the untreated outcome, Y (0), is only observed for comparison units.
Hence, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each individual and the other
is unobserved.
Our main focus is on the population average treatment effect on the treated (τ p,t) and
its sample counterpart (τ s,t):
τ p,t = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Wi = 1] and τ s,t =
1
N1
∑
i:Wi=1
(Yi(1)− Yi(0)),
whereN1 =
∑N
i=1Wi is the number of treated individuals. The main idea behind matching
estimators is that, if assignment to treatment is independent of the potential outcomes for
individuals with similar values of the covariates, the unobserved potential outcomes can
be imputed by using only the outcomes of similar individuals of the opposite treatment
group. The following key assumptions about the treatment assignment are made:
Assumption 1: For all x in the support of X,
(i) (unconfoundedness) W is independent of (Y (0), Y (1)) conditional on X = x;
(ii) (overlap) c < Pr(W = 1|X = x) < 1− c, for some c.
The combination of unconfoundedness and overlap is referred to as strong ignorability
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The overlap assumption restricts the joint distribution of
observables and it requires that the conditional probability of receiving treatment, also
known as the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), is bounded away from
zero and one. Without overlap in the covariates distributions, all individuals with a
given covariate pattern would receive the same treatment and there would be no similar
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individuals of the opposite treatment group. The unconfoundedness assumption, also
known as “selection on observables”, validates comparisons of individuals with the same
covariates values, i.e. the following is true:
E[Y (w)|X = x] = E[Y (w)|W = w,X = x] = E[Y |W = w,X = x]. (2)
That is, systematic differences in outcomes between treated and control units with the
same values for the covariates are attributable to the treatment. Thus, the average treat-
ment effect can be recovered by averaging E[Y |W = 1, X = x]−E[Y |W = 0, X = x] over
the distribution of X.
Given the richness of the Portuguese Health Survey, we believe that the unconfounded-
ness assumption is not unreasonable in our context. In this respect, it is worth remarking
that the NHS is available to everyone almost for free and of relatively high quality. As
argued in the beginning of the Section, it is unlikely that individuals anticipating a high
healthcare demand choose to become civil servants in order to obtain ADSE coverage.
In many studies, the number of exogenous variables is large and an exact match may
be impossible. Therefore, matching is based on the observations that are “close” in terms
of their covariate values. More precisely, let jm(i) be the index of the individual that is
the m-th closest match to individual i in terms of the distance measure based on the norm
‖·‖, among the individuals with the treatment opposite to that of individual i. Formally,
jm(i) is the index j that solves Wj = 1−Wi and
N∑
l:Wl=1−Wi
1 {‖ Xl −Xi ‖≤‖ Xj −Xi ‖} = m, (3)
where 1 {·} is the indicator function, equal to one if the expression in brackets is true
and zero otherwise.16 Matching is carried out with replacement, allowing each individual
to be used as a match more than once, which produces matches of higher quality than
matching without replacement by increasing the set of possible matches.
The simple matching estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated that
AI propose uses the following estimates for the imputed potential outcomes for control
individuals:
16These definitions can easily be generalized to allow for the presence of ties.
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Yˆi(0) =


Yi if Wi = 0,
1
M
∑
j∈IM (i)
Yj if Wi = 1,
(4)
where IM(i) denotes the set of indices for the first M matches for individual i. In words,
the missing potential outcomes are estimated by averaging the outcomes of the nearest
neighbors of the opposite treatment group. Hence, the simple matching estimator for the
average treatment effect for the treated discussed in AI is:
τˆ sm,t =
1
N1
∑
i:Wi=1
(Yi − Yˆi(0)) (5)
where N1 denotes the number of treated individuals in the sample.
AI show that due to matching discrepancies this estimator has a bias of orderO(N−1/K),
where K is the number of continuous covariates. To remove this bias, they propose a
bias-corrected matching estimator that adjusts the differences within the matches for
the differences in their covariate values by combining the matching process with a re-
gression adjustment. The adjustment is based on an estimate of the regression function
µw(x) ≡ E[Y (w)|X = x] forW = 0 since we are interested in estimating the average treat-
ment effect for the treated.17 Given the estimated regression function for the controls,
the missing potential outcomes are predicted as:
Y˜i(0) =


Yi if Wi = 0,
1
M
∑
j∈IM (i)
(Yj + µˆ0(Xi)− µˆ0(Xj)) if Wi = 1,
(6)
with corresponding estimator for the ATT:
τˆ bcm,t =
1
N1
∑
i:Wi=1
(Yi − Y˜i(0)) (7)
This bias adjustment makes matching estimators N1/2-consistent. 18 Our application
suggests that the bias obtained with the simple matching estimator may be large.
17AI use non-parametric estimation to impute the value for the untreated.
18For details on the properties of the matching estimators and their variance see AI.
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6 Results
In this Section we show estimates for the ATT using different specifications.19
Table 6 shows results for number of visits to the doctor and number of tests when
matching is done on a wide set of covariates. We classify the set of covariates into
two groups. Group 1 consists of individual characteristics such as age, female dummy,
marital status, number of family members, region dummies, dummies for the month of
the interview, years of schooling, employment status, occupational dummies, and up to
eleven income level dummies; Group 2 consists of variables that are more related to the
individual’s health status or habits such as on-sick-leave for more than 3 months, on-sick-
leave for less than 3 months, other reasons for not working, daily average consumption of
wine (in litres), underweight, overweight, obesity, restricted activity, and other diseases
such as asthma, diabetes, bronchitis, allergies, high blood pressure, back pain, living habits
such as exercise, smoking, intake of sleeping pills, and subjective measures of health.
Table 7 shows the estimated ATT when we restrict the variables used for matching
to the variables in group 1, and a few variables in group 2 such as asthma, allergies, and
diabetes, which we think are exogenous in this context.20 The other variables in group
2 are potentially problematic. For example, there are at least two problems with the
subjective measures of health although the received literature typically includes them as
controls for unobserved conditions.21 First, perceived health may be endogenous (Wind-
jmeyer and Santos Silva, 1997). A shock affecting the number of visits may also impact
the individual’s perceived health. Second, perceived health may be an intermediary out-
put. For example, ADSE beneficiaries would have a higher perceived health if ADSE
offered higher quality services. The intermediary output classification also applies to the
excluded health status and health habits variables in group 2. In appendix A, we present
a simple regression model showing that variables such as subjective health measures or
19Results were obtained from running different versions of the Abadie & Imbens Matlab programs
provided in their web pages.
20We excluded diabetes from matching for the eldest cohort because it may be the outcome of bad
eating habits and, therefore, related to quality of health services received. On the contrary, it is more
likely to be a genetic condition for the youngest cohorts.
21One of the problems with perceived measures of health identified in the literature is their sensitivity
to the order in the survey. It has been shown that if perceived health is asked at the outset, individuals
tend to tell the truth. This is the case in the Portuguese Health Survey.
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intermediate outcomes may bias the impact of ADSE upwards, as it can be verified from
the comparison of results in tables 6 and 7.
The first segment on Tables 6 and 7 shows the results obtained with the whole sample
(N = 21, 151 and N = 21, 908, respectively). The first two rows correspond to the esti-
mated ATT obtained with a single match (M = 1) while rows three and four correspond
to the estimated ATT obtained with four matches (M = 4). Note that by increasing
the number of matches, one increases the precision of the estimates at the cost of greater
bias. Row five shows the unconditional difference between the ADSE and the NHS-only
group. Row six shows the coefficient of the ADSE dummy in a OLS regression.22 The
three bottom segments in Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated ATT obtained after splitting
the sample into three age groups.23
Results show that, especially for number of visits to the doctor, the simple-matching
estimator of ATT produces at times very different results from the bias-adjusted matching
estimator. As discussed in the previous Section, the simple-matching estimator is biased
when there are continuous covariates, as it is the case of the age variable. Hence, we
regard the bias-adjusted estimates as more reliable.
Table 6 shows that for the overall sample, the simple-matching produces a strong
and statistically significantly different from zero ATT for number of visits to the doctor
whereas the bias-adjusted matching shows a small and not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from zero effect. For number of tests, the difference between the simple-matching
and the bias-adjusted ATT is smaller and both estimates are positive and statistically
significantly different from zero. The statistically insignificant impact of ADSE on num-
ber of visits and the larger effect on number of tests may have several explanations: First,
the heterogeneity of visits, e.g. the requirement to visit the GP before the first visit to a
specialist artificially increases the number of visits for the NHS-only group; Second, higher
22Reported standard deviations for the unconditional mean difference and the OLS regression are
corrected for clustering. This correction may be important since more than one family member may
be present in the sample implying error terms are not independent. Correcting for clustering, however,
hardly affected the standard deviations.
23The variance for the ATT has been calculated using one match and allowing for heteroskedasticity.
Regarding the metric used to measure the distance between covariates, let ‖ x ‖V= (x
′V x)1/2 be the
vector norm with positive definite weight matrix V and define ‖ z − x ‖ to be the distance between the
vectors x and z. We follow Abadie and Imbens and define V as the diagonal matrix of the inverse of the
covariate variances.
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quality services provided to the ADSE group may reduce the number of visits needed to
treat the same condition; Third, the ADSE group is unobservably healthier, which would
occur if the ADSE group enjoyed better services. In order to isolated the latter bias we
present the estimated ATT by age group with the conviction that if it exists, the bias
should be larger for the older generation, which has had more time to accumulate health
benefits relative to their NHS-only counterparts, and smaller or inexistent for the younger
generation. The estimation by age group improved the quality of the matching thereby
reducing the disparity between the simple-matching and the bias-adjusted ATT estimates.
The youngest cohort in Table 6 has the largest estimated ATT for number of visits.
The ATT of 0.533 (bias-adjusted and M = 1) represents 48% of the average number of
visits for that cohort and is very statistically significantly different from zero. As argued,
it is likely that the youngest cohort has not accumulated health benefits so this large effect
is solely due to moral hazard. The second largest estimated ATT (0.342) is obtained for
the oldest cohort but here, although statistically significantly different from zero, it only
represents 18% of the average number of visits for this cohort. The estimated ATT for
the middle-age cohort is very small (0.04) and not statistically significant. The smaller
effects of ADSE on the middle-age and eldest cohorts may be due to the accumulated
health benefits derived from better health care over the years.
The estimated ATT for number of tests in Table 6 is typically smaller than for number
of visits but statistically significantly different from zero for all cohorts but the eldest. The
estimated ATT is largest for younger groups, possibly also reflecting accumulated health
benefits from ADSE coverage. The estimated ATT for the youngest cohort represents
65% of the average number of tests for this age group and 22% of the average for the
middle-age groups. These effects are quite substantial.
When comparing results from Table 6 with those in Table 7 notice that, at least
for number of visits, the differences between the simple-matching and the bias-adjusted
estimates are smallest in the latter. Also, the exclusion of most of the variables in group
2 leads, in general, to a drop in the ATT estimates and, except for the youngest cohort,
to a rise in the standard deviations. The estimated ATT for number of visits in Table
7 are still large for the youngest and oldest cohorts, representing 21.8 and 12.6 percent
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of the average number of visits respectively, but so imprecisely estimated that none of
these estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. In contrast, the ATT for
number of tests is statistically significant for the overall sample and almost statistically
significantly different from zero for the youngest cohort, representing 15.8 and 30 percent
of the average number of tests, respectively.
The samples in the previous Tables 6 and 7 may contain more than one member per
family. In these situations the error terms are not independent, which causes a bias in
the standard deviations. In table 8 we reestimated the ATTs from Table 7 restricting the
sample to one member per family in order to obtain correct standard deviations. Most
results are similar to the ones in Table 7 except the ATT for number of tests for the
youngest cohort, which is now considerably larger and strongly statistically significantly
different from zero.24
Finally, we also estimate the ATT for the variable at least one visit to the dentist in
the 12 months prior to the interview. This variable is very different from the previous
ones since the public coverage of dental services is scant and presents long waiting lists.
Most NHS-only beneficiaries, therefore, consult private dentists for which they have no
insurance coverage. Hence, for dental services, ADSE beneficiaries have a much higher
coverage than the NHS-only group. Theoretically, we expect a positive impact of ADSE
in the probability of visiting a dentist. Table 9 shows the ATT estimates for the whole
sample and the age group subsamples controlling for the smallest set of regressors. Results
show a positive effect for all the samples but the middle-age, but none of the estimates
is statistically significantly different from zero. Chiappori et al. (1998) argued that when
non-monetary costs are large the demand is more inelastic and this may well be the
explanation for the small or inexistence effect of ADSE in dental care. Alternatively,
24Due to the high number of zeros and ones in number of visits and number of tests we decided to
estimate the ATTs also on the binary versions of these variables i.e. at least one visit and at least one
test both in the previous 3 months. The comparison of the estimated ATTs share similar features to
the previous tables. For example, when excluding most covariates from group 2, the simple-matching
ATT estimates became similar to the bias-adjusted estimates, the estimated ATTs dropped, and the
standard deviations increased for all but the yongest cohort. However, the ATT estimates were, in
general, imprecisely estimated so none of the bias-adjusted ATTs for number of visits are statistically
significantly different from zero. For number of tests, again the ATTs are statistically significant for the
overall and the youngest cohort but only statistically significantly different from zero for the middle-age
cohort when all covariates are used for matching. Similarly to the results in Tables 6 and 7, the estimated
ATT is larger for the youngest cohort.
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this result may be the consequence of a coarse dependent variable and if instead we had
number of visits to the dentist we may have found an effect.
7 On the Exogeneity of the Insurance plan
Our identification strategy relies on several assumptions. First, we believe that those
individuals who expect to use more health services do not select themselves to become
civil servants in order to benefit from ADSE coverage. As argued above the greatest
benefit of becoming a civil servant is to hold a job for life and, for some job categories,
the wage offered by the Government is higher than the wage offered by the private sector.
Moreover, other subsystems such as the one associated with the banking sector offer better
health insurance coverage than ADSE. Still, there is the possibility that those who expect
to use more health services, because they are sicker or because they are more risk averse,
would more likely become civil servants. Second, it must be true that the state does not
select its employees on the basis of unobservable (to us) health variables. As we argue
in the previous Section, the Government must make a public call for applicants and the
process is highly regulated and objective. Applicants must fulfill certain criteria and apart
from being physically able for the job, health status is not part of the criteria. Third, for
the unconfoundness assumption to hold, it must be the case that ADSE beneficiaries are
not unobservably healthier, for example because they have enjoyed more years of better
treatment. As discussed above if the latter holds then those individuals who have been
ADSE beneficiaries for a longer period of time would visit the doctor less and demand less
tests than their NHS-only matches. This would imply a smaller impact of ADSE on the
old than on the young because the latter have not yet had the time to accumulate these
health benefits. The results by age group discussed in the previous Section show that the
impact of ADSE is larger for the young cohort and, at least for the case with all covariates,
strongly statistically positive. This suggests that the unconfoundness assumption may not
hold for the middle-age and eldest cohorts or, in other words, that there is a long-term
effect from ADSE.
In order to support the first identification assumption, i.e. whether ADSE beneficiaries
are more risk averse than their NHS-only counterparts, we ran OLS regressions of risky
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life-style habits such as smoking and drinking against the restricted set of covariates and
an ADSE dummy. We find that ADSE beneficiaries consume statistically significantly
more wine but less whisky. All other life-style behaviors were identical in both groups.
These regressions do not offer clear evidence that ADSE beneficiaries are more risk adverse
than NHS-only beneficiaries.
To support the first and the second identification assumptions, we focus on a subsample
of ADSE beneficiaries that obtain ADSE coverage through a family member rather than
in their own name. In principle, people who enjoy ADSE through someone else would only
be subject to moral hazard and, therefore, the first and second identification assumptions
should hold by default. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to identify whether
individuals are covered by ADSE in their own name or through another family member.
Hence, we take a conservative approach and restrict our sample of ADSE beneficiaries to
individuals who are unemployed and, therefore, cannot be civil servants. This approach
is similar to the one followed by Vera (1999) who splits the sample between heads of
households (in principal, those that take the decision of contracting private insurance)
and non-head of households (beneficiaries of the private insurance who do not take the
decision) in order to test for adverse selection in the contract of private insurance.
Table 10 shows the estimated ATT for number of visits to the doctor, number of tests,
and probability of visiting the dentist for unemployed ADSE beneficiaries when excluding
most variables from group 2. The first thing to notice is the imprecision of most ATT
estimates which is due, most likely, to the small sample size (878 observations). We
restrict our description to the bias-adjusted ATT for one match (M = 1) because the
quality of the matches for M = 4 is not good with such a small number of observations.
The magnitude of the ATT for number of visits, number of tests, and for at-least-one
dentist visit are much higher than the ATTs for the overall sample (in Tables 7 and 9),
representing 20 %, 114 % and 17% of the average number of visits, tests, and probability
of dentist visit respectively, although none of these estimates is precisely estimated. For
number of visits and tests we expected a smaller impact of ADSE in this case given that
unemployed people do not have to pay co-payments in NHS but are subject to copayments
under ADSE.
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In conclusion, due to the low number of observations it is hard to find support for our
identifying assumptions although the size of the point estimates seem to indicate that the
ADSE effect is mostly due to moral hazard.
8 Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of additional coverage on the demand of visits to the
doctor, diagnostic tests and the probability of visiting the dentist within the Portuguese
National Health System. Our paper’s contribution to the large literature on moral hazard
is fourfold: First, by using a dataset where 10 percent of the sample enjoys an exoge-
nous double health insurance coverage; Second, by using a matching estimator technique
(Abadie and Imbens, 2004), which does not impose any functional form on the impact of
health insurance on the demand for health services and allows for heterogenous impacts.
Third, by estimating the impact of the additional insurance on several services, partic-
ularly on the diagnostic blood and urine tests. And fourth, by allowing for a dynamic
impact of the additional coverage splitting the sample by age groups.
In general we find that the impact of ADSE is positive and large. For the whole
sample the ADSE effect corresponds to 6 percent of the average number of visits, 15.8
percent of the average number of tests, and 7 percent of the average probability of visiting
a dentist. The effects of ADSE are particularly large for the youngest cohort 18−30 years
old where they reach 21.8, 30 and 11.6 percent of the average number of visits, tests and
probability of visiting the dentist, respectively for that age group. Due to the imprecision
of estimates, however, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for number of
visits is not statistically different from zero. For number of tests, we do find evidence of
moral hazard for the overall sample and the youngest cohort. On the contrary, for dental
services, where we expected to find the greatest ATT, we do not find evidence of moral
hazard. We argue following Chiappori et al. (1998) that the inexistence of moral hazard
for dental visits is the consequence of large non-monetary costs for this type of services.
Supply inducement if it existed would be less likely to occur in the at-least-one-visit
to the dentist since ADSE pays all doctors but dentists per visit. Our data does not
allow us to differentiate between the effects of moral hazard and supply-induced demand
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but the presence of supply-induced demand would lead to an overestimation of the moral
hazard effect. However, there is no reason why demand inducement should be larger for
the younger cohort (18-30 years old). Quite the contrary, we should expect inducement to
be larger for the older cohort since these, specially the retirees, have a lower opportunity
cost of time and, therefore, a more inelastic demand (e.g. van de Voorde et al., 2001).
Our results are also consistent with long-term positive effects from ADSE since the
estimated ATT is lower for older generations who may have accumulated health benefits
from better treatment and enjoy better unobserved health than their NHS-only counter-
parts.
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9 Appendix A
Here we present an argument for excluding subjective measures from some of our regres-
sions. Denote by y the number of visits to the doctor and H the subjective measure of
health or any intermediate output (for simplicity take H to be a continuous variable).
For notation simplicity assume all other characteristics X are constant. then the demand
for visits could be modelled as:
y = α + βADSE + γH + ε (8)
H = a0 + a1ADSE + u (9)
Suppose for the moment that ε and u are not correlated. We check the bias under
correlation below. The partial derivative (obtained when including subjective health
measures) is
∂y
∂ADSE
= β (10)
but the total effect (total derivative) is in reality:
dy
dADSE
= β + γa1 < β if γ < 0 (11)
The total effect is more interesting. Of course if we do not include H then we would have
an ommitted variable bias and we would underestimate β, the partial effect.
Now what if the error ε and u are (negative) correlated? It is very likely that the shocks
that affect your perceived health affect your decision to go to the doctor conditional on
H. That means that all estimates in 8 would be inconsistent and in particular γ. So what
happens if we do not include H?
y = α + γa0 + (β + γa1)ADSE + γu+ ε (12)
we would estimate the total effect of ADSE without bias.
10 Appendix B
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Table 1: Doctor Visits by Health Insurance Status. Full sample
Nr. of Doctor Visits At Least 1 Visit (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 1.16 1.89 0 30 0.53 0.50 0 1 4808
NHS 1.27 2.04 0 30 0.53 0.50 0 1 40484
|t-value| 3.56 0.05
p-value 0.0004 0.9576
Table 2: Blood Tests by Health Insurance Status. Full sample
Nr. of Tests At Least 1 Test (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 0.30 0.73 0 10 0.23 0.42 0 1 4811
NHS 0.27 0.67 0 10 0.22 0.41 0 1 40481
|t-value| 2.42 2.15
p-value 0.0155 0.0312
Table 3: Dentist Visits by Health Insurance Status. Full sample
At Least 1 Dentist Visit (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 0.52 0.50 0 1 4251
NHS 0.35 0.48 0 1 33331
|t-value| 21.32
p-value 0.0000
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Table 4: Socio-Economic Characteristics by Health Insurance Status. Full sample
ADSE NHS H0: Equal Means
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. |t-value| p-value
Age 4814 37.528 21.086 40535 42.394 23.196 14.97 0.0000
Female 4814 0.558 0.497 40535 0.519 0.500 5.12 0.0000
HH size 4814 3.321 1.187 40535 3.293 1.412 1.54 0.1243
Respondent = Individual 4814 0.515 0.500 40535 0.515 0.500 0.03 0.9722
Married 4814 0.511 0.500 40535 0.544 0.498 4.33 0.0000
Single 4814 0.415 0.493 40535 0.350 0.477 8.72 0.0000
Widow 4814 0.042 0.201 40535 0.085 0.279 13.36 0.0000
Divorced/Separated 4814 0.032 0.175 40535 0.021 0.144 4.08 0.0000
Norte 4814 0.212 0.409 40535 0.322 0.467 17.38 0.0000
Centro 4814 0.187 0.390 40535 0.202 0.401 2.49 0.0128
Lisboa 4814 0.312 0.463 40535 0.244 0.429 9.66 0.0000
Alentejo 4814 0.170 0.376 40535 0.115 0.319 9.84 0.0000
Algarve 4814 0.119 0.324 40535 0.117 0.322 0.35 0.7285
Years of schooling 4814 8.730 5.483 40499 4.858 3.935 47.57 0.0000
Currently working 4814 0.494 0.500 40533 0.433 0.495 8.10 0.0000
Unemployed 4814 0.006 0.076 40533 0.038 0.192 22.37 0.0000
On sick leave (< 3 months) 4814 0.005 0.067 40533 0.006 0.078 1.48 0.1390
On sick leave (> 3 months) 4814 0.006 0.076 40533 0.010 0.098 3.27 0.0011
Student 4814 0.252 0.434 40533 0.145 0.352 16.42 0.0000
Not in labour force 4814 0.484 0.500 40533 0.508 0.500 3.13 0.0018
Not working (other reason) 4814 0.009 0.092 40533 0.005 0.070 2.60 0.0094
IncomeA 4814 0.007 0.085 40535 0.084 0.277 41.47 0.0000
IncomeB 4814 0.016 0.127 40535 0.117 0.321 41.25 0.0000
IncomeC 4814 0.042 0.200 40535 0.133 0.339 27.29 0.0000
IncomeD 4814 0.072 0.259 40535 0.128 0.334 13.78 0.0000
IncomeE 4814 0.082 0.275 40535 0.124 0.329 9.66 0.0000
IncomeF 4814 0.088 0.284 40535 0.109 0.312 4.68 0.0000
IncomeG 4814 0.103 0.304 40535 0.085 0.278 4.02 0.0001
IncomeH 4814 0.154 0.361 40535 0.079 0.269 14.06 0.0000
IncomeI 4814 0.151 0.358 40535 0.044 0.205 20.32 0.0000
IncomeJ 4814 0.234 0.423 40535 0.035 0.184 32.20 0.0000
IncomeNS 4814 0.041 0.199 40535 0.058 0.233 5.40 0.0000
IncomeNR 4814 0.008 0.091 40535 0.006 0.074 2.07 0.0389
Note:
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Table 5: Health-related Indicators by Health Insurance Status. Full sample
ADSE NHS H0: Equal Means
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. |t-value| p-value
Very good health 3207 0.081 0.273 25400 0.037 0.188 9.00 0.0000
Good health 3207 0.488 0.500 25400 0.355 0.479 14.21 0.0000
Normal health 3207 0.339 0.473 25400 0.380 0.485 4.69 0.0000
Bad health 3207 0.077 0.267 25400 0.180 0.385 19.45 0.0000
Very bad health 3207 0.015 0.121 25400 0.047 0.213 12.84 0.0000
Walking limitations (age>10) 4326 0.009 0.093 37051 0.027 0.162 10.97 0.0000
Diabetes 4814 0.036 0.186 40493 0.056 0.230 6.85 0.0000
Asthma 4811 0.046 0.210 40501 0.062 0.241 4.75 0.0000
Chronic bronchitis 4811 0.020 0.140 40496 0.030 0.170 4.55 0.0000
Allergy 4814 0.162 0.369 40506 0.142 0.350 3.50 0.0005
High blood pressure 4806 0.124 0.330 40434 0.178 0.383 10.57 0.0000
Back pain 4814 0.301 0.459 40504 0.415 0.493 16.10 0.0000
Sleeping pills (age>14) 3942 0.124 0.329 34772 0.130 0.336 1.16 0.2469
Smoker 4809 0.174 0.379 40512 0.176 0.380 0.23 0.8195
Physical exercise (age>14) 3942 0.166 0.372 34784 0.083 0.276 13.49 0.0000
No brushing teeth 4734 0.016 0.126 39905 0.059 0.236 19.79 0.0000
No teeth 4734 0.006 0.079 39905 0.024 0.152 12.47 0.0000
Obese 3630 0.102 0.303 32434 0.132 0.339 5.63 0.0000
Overweight 3630 0.333 0.471 32434 0.374 0.484 5.04 0.0000
Normal weight 3630 0.534 0.499 32434 0.472 0.499 7.12 0.0000
Underweight 3630 0.032 0.175 32434 0.022 0.147 3.21 0.0013
Wine (lt.) 2039 0.211 0.332 17518 0.264 0.331 6.78 0.0000
Beer (lt.) 1483 0.201 0.381 11634 0.261 0.404 5.61 0.0000
Bagaco (lt.) 388 0.016 0.062 3872 0.018 0.048 0.68 0.4998
Whisky (lt.) 843 0.018 0.044 5608 0.018 0.051 0.29 0.7727
Note:
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Table 6: Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits
and blood and urine tests. Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering.
Dependent variables are counts, specification with all covariates
Age Group M Estimator Nr. Doctor Visits Nr. of Tests
ATT (St. Error) ATT (St. Error)
All, N=21,151
1 Simple Matching 0.215 (0.063) 0.116 (0.026)
Bias-adjusted 0.060 (0.062) 0.096 (0.026)
4 Simple matching 0.158 (0.057) 0.089 (0.023)
Bias-adjusted 0.017 (0.056) 0.042 (0.023)
Mean difference -0.124 (0.048) 0.064 (0.020)
Regression 0.030 (0.053) 0.038 (0.023)
18-30, N=2,741
1 Simple Matching 0.623 (0.175) 0.147 (0.049)
Bias-adjusted 0.533 (0.174) 0.137 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.462 (0.154) 0.103 (0.042)
Bias-adjusted 0.340 (0.153) 0.105 (0.042)
Mean difference 0.177 (0.158) 0.053 (0.038)
Regression 0.318 (0.168) 0.047 (0.041)
30-60, N=10,422
1 Simple Matching 0.189 (0.072) 0.082 (0.032)
Bias-adjusted 0.040 (0.071) 0.081 (0.032)
4 Simple matching 0.089 (0.067) 0.033 (0.030)
Bias-adjusted -0.039 (0.066) 0.015 (0.030)
Mean difference -0.124 (0.056) 0.036 (0.023)
Regression -0.036 (0.062) 0.019 (0.029)
60-95, N=7,988
1 Simple Matching 0.206 (0.165) 0.108 (0.070)
Bias-adjusted 0.342 (0.163) 0.053 (0.070)
4 Simple matching 0.298 (0.123) 0.126 (0.057)
Bias-adjusted 0.247 (0.121) 0.051 (0.056)
Mean difference 0.001 (0.110) 0.194 (0.048)
Regression 0.093 (0.118) 0.044 (0.051)
Note: Robust variance. Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.53 (whole sample), 1.12
(18-30), 1.37. (30-60) and 1.87. (60-95). Means of the number of tests are: 0.36 (whole sample),
0.21 (18-30), 0.36 (30-60) and 0.44 (60-95).ALL33
Table 7: Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits
and blood and urine tests. Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering.
Dependent variables are counts, specification with less covariates
Age Group M Estimator Nr. Doctor Visits Nr. of Tests
ATT (St. Error) ATT (St. Error)
All, N=21,908
1 Simple Matching 0.132 (0.100) 0.069 (0.028)
Bias-adjusted 0.096 (0.099) 0.057 (0.028)
4 Simple matching 0.054 (0.074) 0.061 (0.024)
Bias-adjusted 0.015 (0.073) 0.044 (0.024)
Mean difference -0.129 (0.047) 0.059 (0.019)
Regression 0.002 (0.055) 0.029 (0.022)
18-30, N=3,203
1 Simple Matching 0.279 (0.164) 0.072 (0.041)
Bias-adjusted 0.235 (0.165) 0.060 (0.041)
4 Simple matching 0.225 (0.150) 0.069 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted 0.168 (0.150) 0.060 (0.034)
Mean difference 0.112 (0.133) 0.029 (0.031)
Regression 0.191 (0.148) 0.025 (0.033)
30-60, N=10,501
1 Simple Matching 0.021 (0.117) 0.035 (0.041)
Bias-adjusted -0.043 (0.117) 0.036 (0.041)
4 Simple matching -0.081 (0.096) -0.003 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted -0.127 (0.096) 0.014 (0.034)
Mean difference -0.127 (0.056) 0.035 (0.023)
Regression -0.059 (0.068) 0.015 (0.030)
60-95, N=8,204
1 Simple Matching 0.184 (0.175) 0.072 (0.075)
Bias-adjusted 0.236 (0.175) 0.009 (0.075)
4 Simple matching 0.103 (0.134) 0.092 (0.059)
Bias-adjusted 0.114 (0.135) 0.035 (0.059)
Mean difference 0.011 (0.110) 0.195 (0.048)
Regression 0.094 (0.124) 0.045 (0.052)
Note: Robust variance. Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.52 (whole sample), 1.08
(18-30), 1.38. (30-60) and 1.87. (60-95). Means of the number of tests are: 0.36 (whole sample),
0.20 (18-30), 0.33 (30-60) and 0.44 (60-95).NONE34
Table 8: Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits
and blood and urine tests. Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering.
Dependent variables are counts, specification with less covariates. Sample contains only
one observation per family
Age Group M Estimator Nr. Doctor Visits Nr. of Tests
ATT (St. Error) ATT (St. Error)
All, N=16,452
1 Simple Matching 0.091 (0.106) 0.075 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted 0.123 (0.106) 0.065 (0.034)
4 Simple matching 0.038 (0.080) 0.060 (0.032)
Bias-adjusted 0.016 (0.079) 0.049 (0.032)
Mean difference -0.123 (5) (0.052) 0.063 (0.020)
Regression 0.026 (0.061) 0.042 (10) (0.024)
18-30, N=2,115
1 Simple Matching 0.277 (0.220) 0.132 (0.048)
Bias-adjusted 0.256 (0.219) 0.144 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.192 (0.196) 0.104 (0.042)
Bias-adjusted 0.183 (0.196) 0.104 (0.043)
Mean difference 0.148 (0.169) 0.051 (0.039)
Regression 0.205 (0.193) 0.043 (0.042)
30-60, N=8,032
1 Simple Matching -0.016 (0.149) 0.036 (0.044)
Bias-adjusted -0.066 (0.150) 0.032 (0.044)
4 Simple matching -0.066 (0.108) 0.016 (0.039)
Bias-adjusted -0.121 (0.108) 0.030 (0.039)
Mean difference -0.129 (5) (0.059) 0.040 (0.025)
Regression -0.033 (0.072) 0.032 (0.033)
60-95, N=6,305
1 Simple Matching 0.112 (0.183) 0.103 (0.074)
Bias-adjusted 0.087 (0.181) 0.083 (0.074)
4 Simple matching 0.195 (0.139) 0.080 (0.059)
Bias-adjusted 0.185 (0.141) 0.062 (0.060)
Mean difference 0.038 (0.121) 0.184 (0.048)
Regression 0.136 (0.137) 0.055 (0.051)
Note: Robust variance. Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.53 (whole sample), 1.15
(18-30), 1.37 (30-60) and 1.85 (60-95). Means of the number of tests are 0.36 (whole sample),
0.21 (18-30), 0.33 (30-60) and 0.44 (60-95).
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Table 9: Matching and Regression Estimates of the Impact of ADSE on the Demand for
Dental Care. Dependent variable is dichotomic, Specification with less covariates
Age Group M Estimator At Least 1 Dentist Visit
ATT (St. Error)
All, N=19,979 1 Simple Matching 0.044 (0.019)
Bias-adjusted 0.024 (0.019)
4 Simple matching 0.046 (0.015)
Bias-adjusted 0.019 (0.015)
Mean difference 0.181 (0.011)
Regression 0.035 (0.013)
Probit 0.038 (0.014)
18-30, N=2,875 1 Simple Matching 0.077 (0.048)
Bias-adjusted 0.058 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.063 (0.040)
Bias-adjusted 0.034 (0.041)
Mean difference 0.099 (0.032)
Regression 0.035 (0.035)
Probit 0.036 (0.035)
30-60, N=9,715 1 Simple Matching 0.024 (0.024)
Bias-adjusted -0.019 (0.024)
4 Simple matching 0.035 (0.020)
Bias-adjusted -0.022 (0.020)
Mean difference 0.164 (0.014)
Regression 0.029 (0.017)
Probit 0.030 (0.019)
60-95, N=7,390 1 Simple Matching 0.063 (0.036)
Bias-adjusted 0.043 (0.036)
4 Simple matching 0.071 (0.028)
Bias-adjusted 0.033 (0.028)
Mean difference 0.176 (0.022)
Regression 0.032 (0.024)
Probit 0.035 (0.026)
Note: Robust variance. Means of the dentist visit indicator are: 0.34 (whole sample), 0.50
(18-30), 0.40 (30-60) and 0.22 (55-95).
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Table 10: Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician and
dentist visits and blood and urine tests. Standard deviations for regressions are corrected
for clustering. Specification with less covariates. Unemployed sample
M Estimator Nr. At least Nr. At Least At Least 1
visits 1 visit tests 1 Test Dentist visit
1 Simple Matching -0.067 -0.200 -0.200 -0.067 0.156
(1.113) (0.193) (0.434) (0.148) (0.184)
Bias-adjusted 0.262 -0.079 0.352 0.065 0.067
(1.093) (0.185) (0.613) (0.185) (0.175)
4 Simple matching -0.100 -0.200 -0.133 -0.067 0.250
(0.975) (0.145) (0.367) (0.121) (0.140)
Bias-adjusted 0.025 -0.028 -0.159 -0.084 0.064
(1.001) (0.186) (0.483) (0.156) (0.164)
Mean difference 0.232 -0.193 0.095 -0.051 0.281
(0.835) (0.123) (0.264) (0.104) (0.123)
Regression 0.464 -0.143 0.130 0.020 0.187
(0.849) (0.132) (0.278) (0.107) (0.132)
Probit - -0.149 - 0.014 0.202
(0.133) (0.103) (0.133)
Note: Robust standard errors in round brackets. N. Obs.=878 for doctor and tests regressions
and N. Obs=788 for dentist visits regressions. Sample means of the dependent variables: number
of physician visits (1.30), at least one physician visit (0.52), number of tests (0.31), at least one
test (0.25), at least one dentist visit (0.39).
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